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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE O,F UTAH
ASPEN ACRES ASSOCIATION,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent
VS.

SEVEN ASSOCIATES, INC.,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
12825

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Plaintiff and Respondent now petitions for rehearing of
the above entitled cause in accordance with the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Respondent makes the following citations of
error in the decision of this case.
1. The decision erroneously holds that an association
of lot owners cannot be empowered to acquire and thereafter maintain, improve, and protect road and/or water
systems serving the subdivision.
2. The decision consistently adopts findings which are
contrary to or unsupported by the evidence.
3. The decision consistently substitutes its judgment as
to witness credibility for the trial court's judgment.
4.

The decision provides no guidelines for the trial court.

Dated this 2 lst day of May, 1973.
FRANK J. ALLEN
Attorney for Respondent
l

BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
About 1960, one Max Bateman began subdivision development of a half section of land (the "Tract") in Summit
County. He filed plats covering roughly the middle half of
the Tract, and these plats identified the subdivided area as
"Aspen Acres". So far as the evidence shows, no part of the
Tract lying north or south of the subdivided area has been
referred to as "Aspen Acres".
In August of 1962, Mr. Bateman called a meeting of
Aspen Acres lot owners. His attorney had prepared articles
for a lot owners' association, and he induced the owners to form
an association (Respondent here) ro assume responsibility for
road and water system maintenance. He promised to clothe
Respondent with sufficient power to permit it to function
effectively. In implementation of that promise, Bateman conveyed the water rights for "Aspen Acres" to the Respondent.
He also participated or acquiesced in actions by which Respondent exercised control over the use of the access road to

the subdivision.
From the moment of its formation, Respondent asserted
control over the water system including the transmission line
which crosses the unsubdivided part of the Tract north of
Aspen Acres. Respondent further filed all necessary application, negotiated necessary easements, and installed necessary
devices to assure water meeting Division of Health quantity and
quality standards and to convey the water from this point of
diversion to Aspen Acres Subdivision.
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On March 27, 1963, Bateman contracted to convey the
Tract to Appellant, Seven Associates, Inc. All of the officers
of Appellant were members of Respondent association. All
of them had construction knowledge of Respondent's ownership of the water-right and claim of right to road and water
system control. Certainly, Appellant took title subject to easements which an inspection of the land would reveal.
Appellant's recognition of an obligation to convey to Respondent the "water rights and wati::r system including tanks
and equipment and rights of way pertaining thereto" was apparent from the moment of Appellant's acquisition of equitable title to the Tract. There were immediate negotiations
between Appellant and Respondent in this regard. Respondent's minutes show that Appellant's Walton Farmer came to
Respondent on May 1, 1967, specifically to propose an agreement which included Appellant's promise to convey the water
system to Appellant. A form of agreement was prepared on
May 1, and forwarded to Appellant. According to Respondent's
minutes of May 20, the May 1 draft was returned to Respondent with suggested changes. Modification was approved by
Respondent's board of directors at its May 20th meeting.
On May 22, 1963, there was a membership meeting
called by Respondent. Both signers of an agreement (introduced in evidence here as Exhibit 15 P) were present. The
agreement is dated May 22. Appellant's Walton Farmer
addressed Respondent's membership and stated orally the
promises which are reduced to writing in Exhibit 15 P. The
agreement unquestionably bears the authentic signatures of
Walton Farmer for Appellant and Ken Stahr for Appellant.
The signed agreement was found in Respondent's files after
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this suit was commenced. No one except its signers knows
how the agreement got in Appellant's files. Mr. Stahr, who
signed for Respondent, was one of the Seven Associates at the
time of trial.
In any event, the Exhibit 15 P agreement was a subject
of discussion and/or resolution at every Respondent board and
membership meeting from the time Appellant purchased from
Bateman until the date of Exhibit 15 P, the total elapsed time
being less than two months. Thereafter, there is no reference
in any minutes to the agreement or the negotiations for the
water system acquisition, and the parties conducted themselves in every respect as if the agreement were in effect until
the approximate date (some seven years later) of the commencement of this action.

The purpose of this petition is to point up to the Court
how intolerable is the position of the lot owners within the subdivision if the Court's decision stands without clarification. If
we comprehend the decision, it says the lot owners have no
right to provide water and access to the subdivision, and the
Subdivision has no duty to do so. Unless the subdivider chooses
to maintain a water system and keep the access road in repair
therefore, the Subdivision must simply atrophy. It certainly is
not politically or economically feasible for each lot owner to
locate his own water and install his own transmission system.
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PETITION FOR REHEARING
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE DECISION HEREIN ERRONEOUSLY
STATES AS A PRINCIPLE OF LAW THAT AN
ASSOCIATION OF SUBDIVISION LOT OWNERS CANNOT BE EMPOWERED TO ACQUIRE
AND THEREAFTER MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE ROAD AND WATER SYSTEMS FOR
THE SUBDIVISION.
The decision in this case appears to declare the law of
this State to be that an association of lot owners within a subdivision cannot be empowered to acquire and thereafter improve and maintain the road or water system serving the subdivision. It should be noted that this Court's insistence that
a lot owners' association is without status to maintain legal
action to protect such systems is entirely inconsistent with and
disruptive of the planning concept under which Summit County
contemplates development.
It is clearly a major concern of Summit County (and all
other counties where resort-type subdivisions are appropriate)
that a developer will sell out a subdivided tract and then leave
without making adequate provision for subsequent water and
road service to subdivision residents. Accordingly, the County
Commision has enacted a subdiviion ordinance which requires
every subdivider to cause a lot owner's association to be formed
and to empower the association to function in the manner and
for the purpose contemplated by Respondent's Articles of Incorporation and other organic documents. The specific section
of the Ordinance to which we call attention is Section 6-E-5.

5

We submit that the responsibility to assure municipal services
to summer home subdivisions cannot practically be imposed on
any entity except an association of lot owners in a county with
a small, dispersed population and a small tax base. In theory,
it may be logical to impose these obligations on the land subdivider. In practice, subdividers conveniently evanesce. The
county is financially unable to provide municipal services to
these communities.
The Court's conviction that the Respondent here is without status or authority to act for the protection of the subdivision stems, as we read the decision, entirely from its enchantment with the language of the Colorado Court in the case of
Stanley Heights Property Owners Association, Inc. vs. Whiteside, 151 Colo. 429, 378 P.2d 399. We would agree that, if
one reads just the language quoted by this Court and not the
entire decision, Stanley seems to support the conclusion reached
by this Court. Stanley is, however, entirely distinguishable from
the instant case on its facts. In Stanley, the land owner first
conveyed easements to subdivision lot owners and thereafter
purported to convey rights to the Plaintiff which were inconsistent with the previous grant. The subsequent litigation
was between the senior and junior grantees. The Trial Court
held, and the Supreme Court confirmed, that the junior grantee
had rceived nothing by its grant not because the junior grantee
was without legal status but because its grantor did not own the
rights purportedly conveyed. The Supreme Court of Colorado,
in the course of the Stanley opinion, made this observation
about the source of rights the Plaintiff was attempting to assert:
"The Trial Court was of the opinion that the
Trustee's Deed granted no rights to the Association,
and that any attempt in that instrument to convey
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·~ould be contrary to the grant made in' the declaration."
In Stanley, the property owners association was the junior
grantee. In the instant case, the association is senior. It acquired its water rights and asserted its rights of control over the
road and water systems before Appellant was even incorporated. Appellant contracted with Bateman at a time when Respondent's claims of right were open and notorious. Within
two months after contracting with Bateman, Appellant signed
a document acknowledging the validity of those claims with respect to the water system.

All of the principles announced by the Court in Stanley
operate here in Respondent's favor rather than in Appellant's
favor. It may be that an Aspen Acres lot owner not a member
of Respondent association has rights which Respondent's manner of functioning doesn't satisfy. If so, the declaration of those
rights is not appropriate in the framework of this litigation.
No such lot owner is a party to this suit. This is a suit to
declare rights and duties as between Max Bateman (and Appellant as his successor in interest) on the one hand, and the
association Bateman caused to be formed, to which he made
promises and conveyances, and which has performed for more
than a decade, on the other.
We submit that Stanley is not a controlling precedent on
this Court even if it held that an association of lot owners could
not be empowered to act for the community. Certainly, it
should not be relied upon as a basis for disrupting Summit
County's planning concept and divesting Aspen Acres Subdivision of access to water and access to highways when it does
not support the proposition announced by the Court.
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-POINT

II

THE DECISION ERRONEOUSLY ADOPTS
FINDINGS WHICH ARE CONTRARY TO THE
EVIDENCE.
In the course of its decision herein, this Court makes a
number of statements of fact which are contrary to the findings
of the Trial Court and, we believe contrary to the evidence.
First, this Court states that ". . . both parties have expended money for the maintenance of roads and water system." The evidence does not support any finding that Appellant has expended money for maintenance of any system. Exhibit 21-D is a collection of checks made by Appellant mostly
in the summer and fall of 1964. The monies were expended
(R. 385 et seq.) entirely for installation of water system,
essentially to satisfy an obligation to provide service to fifteen
lots as required by the contract under which Appellant purchased from Max Bateman. It does not appear that any of
the money was spent in the annual effort to keep the road
and water systems in repair. This is apparent from the mere
fact that all of the checks except the last of the group are dated
in 1964. The last check is dated in August of 1967 and is
payable to the United States Department of Interior. We find
no testimony linking that expenditure to a maintenance activity.
Second, the Court seems to conclude that the phrase
"known as 'Aspen Acres' ", as used in the deeds conveying subdivision lots and water rights refers to any land then owned or
later to be acquired by the developer. We submit that, when a
subdivision plat is filed and a name associated with the subdivided area, that name cannot thereafter loosely be employed
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to encompass an area of indeterminate boundary. We submit
that, when Max Bateman used the term "Aspen Acres" and
when Appellant used the term "Aspen Acres", and when Respondent used the term "Aspen Acres", only the area within
the subdivision plats then on file was intended to be identified.
There is no reason for Bateman to have assigned the water
rights in trust for owners of lots within only Aspen Acres if
he intended to benefit owners of all lots within the Tract.
Third, this Court characterized Respondent's production of
Exhibit 15-P (which Respondent acknowledges having located
in its voluminous files shortly before trial) as constituting a
"change in its theory." The document in question is a reduction to writing of exactly the promises which Respondent
alleged from the day of its complaint Appellant or its predecessor had made and on which Respondent had relied. The
location of the document did not change the theory of the case
in any repect. Exhibit 15-P was offered and received as additional evidence that Appellant had made the promises which are
alleged in the Complaint. Before trial began, the Trial Judge
was informed by counsel of the circumstances under which the
Agreement was located. Since the matter was being tried by
the Court, an offer was made to continue the matter if the
document's late production would complicate the presentation
of Appellant's case. Appellant chose not to request continuance, and it does not appear that Appellant's presentation would
have been any simpler if the document had been produced
earlier.
Fourth, the decision characterizes the "conduct of plaintiff
subsequent to the alleged date of execution of the contract"
as being "inconsistent with its claim that it had a valid and
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binding contract to acquire the water system." Respondent's
conduct was in no sense inconsistent with its claim of right to
have this water system conveyed to it. Respondent maintained
the system for almost a decade, Respondent improved the system from time to time, and entered the unsubdivided portion
of the Tract without any objection from Appellant. As soon
as Appellant questioned Respondent's right to exercise dominion over this system, Respondent brought suit asserting "a
valid and binding" promise by Appellant to convey the system.
The evidence will not support a finding that Respondent's
conduct has been inconsistent with its claims.
Finally, this Court ruled that the trial court could not
properly find, on the evidence, that Walton Farmer was acting within the implied scope of his authority when he signed
Exhibit 15 P. The trial court's finding that Farmer was acting
within the implied scope of his authority was based on these
undisputed facts.
1. Farmer is the representative of Appellant who al-

ways dealt with Respondent. He appeared at
Aspen Acres Board meetings on May 1, and May
20, 1963.

2. By Appellant's own exhibit ( 20-D), it appears that
Farmer was soliciting other investors in Appellant's
venture and that the venture was basically a partnership enterprise.
3. Farmer appeared and addressed the membership at
Respondent's membership meeting of May 22,
1963. Others of the Seven Associates were present.
None challenged Farmer's authority to make the
promises he is reported to have made.
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This court does not indicate on what basis a corporate
officer's authority can be implied. The evidence in this case
does not show, however, that any of Appellant's officers except Farmer acted for the corporation between the date of Appellant's contract with Bateman and the date of Exhibit 15 P.

POINT

III

THE DECISION SUBSTITUTES THIS COURT'S
JUDGMENT AS TO THE CREDIBILITY OF
WI1NESSES FOR THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT.
The trial court clearly found that Exhibit 15 P, since it
bore authentic signatures of officers of both parties to the
agreement and was found in Respondent's files, was intended
to be and was an enforceable agreement. The evidence of its
delivery to Respondent was the fact of its being in Respondent's possession. This Court ruled, however, that the trial court
was obliged to believe the speculation of a witness that the
document produced by Respondent had been blown away
along with some other documents during a meeting in Weber
Canyon and presumably found after several years by someone
sympathetic to Respondent's position.
We submit that the exhibit shows no signs of having spent
years on a mountainside. It bears a date when both signers are
known to have been in the Utah Power and Light auditorium.
There is a history of negotiation of this very agreement leading
up to May 22, and on that date Mr. Farmer made a speech
consistent with contemporaneous signing and delivery of the
agreement.
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This Court had no opportunity, as did the trial court, to
observe the witnesses. Appellant's version of how Exhibit
15 P got into Respondent's possession strains credulity under
the best of circumstances. Under the circumstances of this case
(where the record so clearly implies a signature and delivery
at the May 22 membership meeting) it is error for this Court
to require that Appellant's story be believed.
POINT

IV

THE DECISION PROVIDES NO GUIDELINES
FOR THE TRIAL COURT.
This action was brought under the declaratory judgment
statute. The prayer was for a declaration of the rights and
duties of the parties under the circumstances. The predicament of Aspen Acres lot owners is this:
1. They must rely on a water source located north of
the Tract - and that 8 water must be conveyed
across land owned by Appellant.
2. They must rely on a water right which has been
assigned to Repondent subject to a trust in their
favor.
3. They must reach the subdivision from the public
highway via an access road which Respondent has
been maintaining for ten years. No other entity
acknowledges an obligation to maintain it.
The decision in this case appears to say that Respondent
has no rights and Appellant no duties with regard to the delivery of water and the maintenance of roads to and within the
subdivision. This Court then directs the trial court to declare
the rights and duties of the parties in accord with the decision.
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We believe the Court should instruct the trial court in these
respects.
1. Does any entity have a duty to assure the delivery
of water to the subdivision?

2. If so, does that entity have a right to construct and
maintain a pipeline across the north portion of
the tract to the subdivision?
3. Who are the beneficiaries of the trust upon which
the water right was assigned to Respondent, the
owners of lots within Aspen Acres Subdivision, the
owners of land within the "Tract", or the owners of
any land which may hereafter be subdivided under
the name "Aspen Acres"?
4. If, as the evidence shows, there is not enough water
for the Tract, how should the available water be
allocated?
5. How can the costs of maintaining the access road
into Aspen Acres be allocated?
It is vital to this community of significant size that these
questions be answered and that a declaration of rights and
duties be made. Respondent is prepared to assume the responsibilities of providing the necesary municipal services but this
Court says it must not. If it is the Court's belief that neither
water nor access should be made available to the community,

the court should so indicate.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANK

J.

ALLEN

Attorney for Respondent
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